George Christopher Stead's aim, throughout his scholarly work, was to lay bare and explain. He was very good at it, as this first piece in 1961 shows. It is a fine example of Stead's mature thinking. All the features that distinguish his work and made it fresh at the time are apparent here: clarity and directness, thoroughness of research, a gift for illustration of a technical point of logic from plain examples; and the, perhaps most noticeable, sign of an essay (...) on some patristic theme's being his very own–the presence in it of critical appraisal. Though Stead was, sometimes and in other contexts, to voice sharply destructive criticism, his appraisals are usually conducted, as in this first essay, so that sympathy with the ancient writer is preserved. (shrink)

Electrophysiology deals with apparatus applied in a stimulus response situation. This technique is partly concerned with physical problems, partly with biological ones. The failure to appreciate differences in these problems leads to assumptions which require critical examination. Assumptions stating the constancy of objective stimuli, the meaning of inter and intra-individual variation, and the stability of the so-called “resting level” are examined.Some experiments are cited which reveal complications by the apperception of the patient and which have a significant influence on electrophysiological (...) data. The evocation of stress reactions by routine laboratory procedures is discussed and a suggestion is made of the way in which the validity of electro-physiological measurements may be improved.Dans la science de l'électro-physiologie on se sert des instruments pour mesurer des processus de réaction d'une objet stimulée.La méthodique dans cette science est dérivée partiellement de la science biologique et partiellement de la science physicale.Une des difficultées est d'apprécier justement des differences dans les problèmes de mesure dans les deux terraines scientifiques, ce que mène à des assumptions douteuses, qui a besoin d'une examination scrupuleuze.Des assumptions concernant la constance de stimulations objectives, la significance des variations inter- et intra-individuelles et la stabilité du niveau, dit „resting level”, sont examinés.Quelques experiments, révelant des complexités dans l'apperception des patients ayant une influence importante sur les données électro-physiologiques, sont cités.L'évocation des réactions de tension, par des procedures routinières en laboratoire sont discutés et une suggestion afin d'améliorer la validité des données de mesure électrophysiologique est donnée.In der Elektrophysiologie ist man beschäftigt mit Instrumentarium, waraus die Zusammenhang zwischen Reiz und Reaktion untersucht wird. In diesen Untersuchungen werden Methoden angewandt, welche teils aus der biologischen, teils aus der physikalischen Wissenschaft stammen. Es kommt vor, dass Unterschiede in Messungsprobleme innerhalb jedem Fachgebiet nicht richtig gewertet werden, was zu Annahmen führt, welche eine kritische Analyse bedürfen.Annahmen was betrifft, die Konstanz von objective Reize, die Bedeutung von inter- und intra-individuellen Variationen und die Konstanz des sogenannten „resting level”, wurden einer Analyse unterzogen.Einige Experimenten sind zitiert, die eine erhebliche Komplexität in der Wahrnehmungsempfindung des Patienten nachweisen und die eine bedeutungsvolle Einfluss haben auf den elektro-physiologischen Angaben. Das Hervorrufen Spannungsreaktionen durch Routine-vorgänge im Laboratorium wurde diskutiert und eine Weise um mit möglicherweise zuverlassigem Erfolg elektro-physiologischen Messungen aus zu führen wurde vorgeschlagen. (shrink)

Sports medicine is a rapidly expanding area of clinical practice. The pitchside physician faces many ethical challenges in managing the injuries and wellbeing of sports men and women. This brief essay describes some of the dilemmas frequently encountered by the pitchside physician and calls for a discussion of the issues raised.

Philosophers of experiment have acknowledged that experiments are often more than mere hypothesis-tests, once thought to be an experiment's exclusive calling. Drawing on examples from contemporary biology, I make an additional amendment to our understanding of experiment by examining the way that `wide' instrumentation can, for reasons of efficiency, lead scientists away from traditional hypothesis-directed methods of experimentation and towards exploratory methods.

L R Perry; Training and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 7–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1972.tb00.

After summarizing my own views of 'I' and the first-person perspective, I consider a well-known autistic, Temple Grandin, who claims that she thinks only in pictures, not in language. I argue, to the contrary, that Grandin's mental life as she describes it in fact requires language, which, as a writer, she undoubtedly has. Finally, I turn to the question of whether thought as Temple Grandin describes it is independent of language.

In this book, Mark Rowlands challenges the Cartesian view of the mind as a self-contained monadic entity, and offers in its place a radical externalist or environmentalist model of cognitive processes. Drawing on both evolutionary theory and a detailed examination of the processes involved in perception, memory, thought and language use, Rowlands argues that cognition is, in part, a process whereby creatures manipulate and exploit relevant objects in their environment. This innovative book provides a foundation for an unorthodox but increasingly (...) popular view of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of species have focused on multicellular, sexual animals and have often neglected to consider unicellular organisms like bacteria. This article begins to fill this gap by considering what species concepts, if any, apply neatly to the bacterial world. First, I argue that the biological species concept cannot be applied to bacteria because of the variable rates of genetic transfer between populations, depending in part on which gene type is prioritized. Second, I present a critique of phylogenetic bacterial species, (...) arguing that phylogenetic bacterial classification requires a questionable metaphysical commitment to the existence of essential genes. I conclude by considering how microbiologists have dealt with these biological complexities by using more pragmatic and not exclusively evolutionary accounts of species. I argue that this pragmatism is not borne of laziness but rather of the substantial conceptual problems in classifying bacteria based on any evolutionary standard. (shrink)

The third edition gives particular attention to neuroimaging, which has emerged in the past decade as one of the most active areas of research in the field.

L. R. Reinhardt; III—Dualism and Categories, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 71–92, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: In the light of the almost brilliant equilibrium of the author, who manages to compose a resourceful explanation, switching between the notional conditionality and the expected contextual understanding, I intend to focus on the interdisciplinary potential of some suggestions that offer new perspectives on conceiving society, which are driven by a non-analytical and holistic vision.

In the course of writing this book, answers to the following questions and many others were given in both narrative and visual form. Most of them were presented rather forcefully, and not when I was expecting them. I understood that I was to share what I learned. What is in store for the geology of North America? How do we create matter every day? What is the nature of nature? How did people live more than a half million years ago? (...) What was space travel like a half million years ago? Where is God? What are our responsibilities as humans? Is Hitler in heaven? How can we go to heaven? (shrink)

Within the framework of Neurological Positivism this article describes how brain algorithms are translated into mathematics in ontogeny and in culture. The purpose is to address seemingly contradictory research findings that suggest that while mathematical axioms are innate, they are not the direct result of processes of selection. It is proposed that self-referencing feedback processes of maximum-power evolution guide the construction of algorithmic isomorphies between preadapted brain algorithms and mathematics. It is concluded that maximum-power evolution as described in NP offers (...) mechanisms that make sense of findings that suggest that mathematical axioms are innate, yet not directly the result of selection as traditionally understood. It is concluded also that these mechanisms provide insight into the often intuitive nature of mathematical discovery. (shrink)